Turkey has a long and storied history intertwining organized crime syndicates and state power. Since the early 20th century, influential mob bosses and violent gangs have exploited connections within the security services and corridors of political power for protection and profit. But the 21st century case of once notorious crime ringleader Sedat Peker illustrates that even the most securely connected figures can eventually fall from grace and turn against their former backers.
The Roots of Turkish Mob Rule Run Deep
To understand how characters like Sedat Peker gain and lose influence requires looking back to the origins of Turkey‘s network of organized criminal groups.
As we saw earlier, Kabadayı Mehmet emerged in the 1920s as a Gambino-esque godfather figure ruling the bustling Beyoğlu district of newly minted capital Istanbul. But whereas the classic Italian mafia hierarchy revolved around family loyalty, Turkish gangs have from the early days relied more on local neighborhood (or mahalle) links and opportunistic collaboration between mob outfits.
Instead of centralized leadership under a singular capo di tutti capi ("boss of all bosses"), loose networks emerge via personalities who control pockets of territory or rackets, forging temporary allegiances when aims overlap.
Thus we see figures like mid-century mob boss Dündar Kılıç alternately battling rival gangs and flipping alliances between various outfits across decades cloaked in gun smoke and bomb blasts before dying comfortably in old age of natural causes – rare for such a brutal underworld.
Whereas American counterparts like Al Capone met sensational ends, Kılıç survived thanks to cultivated connections among Istanbul‘s political class. And he represented just one early example of the crucial deep state links that came to define the Turkish mafia landscape.
Mobs Morph Into "Deep State" Pawns
In fact, analysts pinpoint the watershed 1962 moment when shadowy elements with suspected police ties gunned down rising mob boss Cemali Coşar on the streets of Fatih district as a pivotal shift. His murder demonstrated that mere muscle or street rep would no longer suffice for ambitious Turkish crime lords. Political protection had become paramount.
Thus we enter the 1970s era that birthed still-notorious kingpins like Alaattin Çakıcı as well as a young Sedat Peker. This period saw mob factions transform into more regimented organized crime syndicates – often backed by allies in the intelligence and security services. They grew more prone to being co-opted into acts of indirect state-sponsored terror.
The 1996 Susurluk scandal exposed links between Turkish security officials, politicians, and criminals.
This deep state degree of collaboration hit the public spotlight after a 1996 car crash killed a deputy police chief, an MP, and notorious crime boss Hüseyin Kocadağ. The incident later became known as the Susurluk scandal, and revealed connections between security forces, ultranationalist militants, and politicians.
But public outrage didn‘t sever these links. Figures like Çakıcı and Peker continued growing into powerful kingpins over the following decades, seeming untouchable with friends in high places. Peker particularly became a go-to mercenary for Erdogan against dissidents as his influence hit heights up until around 2020 when his fortunes suddenly turned.
From Golden Boy To Public Enemy No. 1
For much of the 2010s, Sedat Peker was photographed alongside President Erdoğan and senior officials at state functions despite barely concealing his ongoing criminal activities. His open aid for ruling party political aims bought him apparent immunity.
Peker allegedly mobilized mobs of loyal followers – dubbed "Peker‘s Brigades" – to stage rallies, attack opposition protests, and threaten critics. All seemed well until 2020 when he suddenly fled Turkey facing charges over business dealings as political tides shifted. Finding himself disparaged by former allies, Peker struck back with an online PR campaign exposing their alleged misdeeds.
Peker‘s rise and fall as a state-backed crime boss made waves across Turkey‘s political landscape. (BirGun)
Through YouTube videos recorded abroad, Peker has directly accused former Interior Minister Mehmet Ağar of past mafia links and ordering high-profile assassinations and journalists while leading the intelligence service in the ‘90s. Such allegations threaten to completely erode remaining public trust in institutions.
Devastating Blows To An Already Compromised System
The impacts of revelations coming from former insiders like Peker cannot be understated in a country where skepticism of state authority already runs high in the wake of events like the Susurluk collisions or the token "Ergenekon" mob roundups of years past.
Surveys suggest up to 70% of Turkish adults believe shadowy groups with mafia ties exert real influence on government decisions. And this latest scandal threatens to worsen the endemic public trust crisis.
| Year | Public Trust In Judiciary | Public Trust In Police |
|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 43% | 51% |
| 2022 | 22% | 32% |
Approval ratings slump amid claims of selective justice and politically-motivated cases.
The cycle of revelations, followed by limited superficial reforms aimed mostly at opposition groups repeats itself endlessly. Mobster Sedat Peker ironically now plays the whistleblower exposing security officials he once collaborated with.
Few have faith that his viral allegations will truly prompt the complete house cleaning demanded because the current system he criticizes owes its very power base to the same type of entanglements Peker describes. Only real bottom-up changes altering everything from financial donation rules to presidential powers limiting partisan interference in investigations could de-fang the deep state.
Troubling Parallels In Other "Pariah" States
The global narcotics trade that helped finance Peker and his criminal contemporaries for years depends on lax attitudes toward rule of law and corruption in transit countries allowing passage.
Turkey led the world heroin seizures in past years as the Balkans-Afghan corridor facilitated flows, earning it status as a "narco-state" not unlike Venezuela‘s collapsing dictatorial regime. These trends reflect a link between authoritarian governance styles and the underworld that enables illicit economies to thrive.
In parts of Latin America and ex-Soviet regions, similar dynamics play out where niche mafias wield political leverage as minority parties or private militias that larger ruling regimes rely on against dissent. Rare high-profile justice efforts usually target political opponents over state-tied mobsters.
The common thread seems to be regimes facing external diplomatic pressures, economic uncertainty, or domestic opposition blowback drilling down on crony criminal pacts as a survival strategy. Rarely does this facilitate durable democracy. More often it substitutes one strain of tyranny for another.
No End In Sight to Turkey‘s Mafia State Cycle
Citizens hold out hope the latest scandals from Peker‘s mouth will truly bring accountability. But the precedents are not encouraging given the resilience and adaptability underworld-state networks proved over generations helmed by Dağhanlar, Pekers and Çakıcıs dating back near a century.
New controversies flare up, occasionally scorching individual prominent figures. But deep ties binding governing regimes and global underground economies linked to everything from party financing to proxy militancy endure outliving their individual codifiers – much like Dündar Kılıç‘s miraculous gangster longevity defying the era‘s violent norm.
Until foundations shift unshackling key institutions from partisan agendas and assets, the cycle of affairs seems likely to continue repeating. The names and parties implicated may rotate in and out of headlines. But the game remains the same. And veterans of the playing field grow adept at bending rules without breaking, leaving truth buried in hints and allegations alongside the odd state enemy like Peker ejected when no longer convenient.