Li Keqiang’s sudden passing in a drowning accident brought a shocking end to his decade-long tenure as China’s Premier. While an investigation continues into the full circumstances surrounding his death, its abruptness has prompted tough questions about the health of the country’s leadership, both politically and physically.
Meteoric Rise Through the Ranks
Li Keqiang’s appointment as Premier in 2013 marked the culmination of a rapid ascent within the Communist Party’s Youth League leadership pipeline. Beginning as party secretary in small Henan villages during the late 1990s, he soon caught the attention of his mentor, then-President Hu Jintao.
Under Hu’s patronage, Li secured a seat on the influential Central Committee in 2002, then took over as party secretary of industrial Liaoning province in 2004 and ascended to the country’s seventh-most senior role of First Vice Premier by 2008.
His climb was enabled by a system of fast-tracking promising young Technocrat leaders molded by the Communist Youth League. This was an attempt to move away from an earlier generation of seniority-based officials following the turmoil of the Maoist era.
| Year | Position |
|---|---|
| 1998 | Party Secretary of Zhengzhou City, Henan Province |
| 2002 | Central Committee Member |
| 2004 | Party Secretary of Liaoning Province |
| 2008 | Vice Premier of China |
| 2013 | Premier of China |
Such meteoric advancement was meant to demonstrate Li’s credentials as a capable administrator ready to take over the economic management duties typically held by the Premier. As Xi Jinping prepared to assume the Party Secretary-ship and Presidency in 2012-2013, Li appeared poised to put reformist rhetoric into action alongside him.
Reformist Agenda Collides with Xi’s Grand Vision
Yet tensions rapidly emerged in the dual leadership model between the liberal economist Premier and the statist Party Secretary Xi.
Li consistently advocated accelerating market reforms, warning that China’s decades-long run of surging economic growth rested on the dividends of Deng Xiaoping-style opening up rather than population size:
"The largest dividend to grow our economy in the past 30 years is not the dividend of population, not the dividend of labor, not the dividend of capital, but the dividend of reform and opening up. This deciding factor has not changed."
He pushed a fundamental overhaul of China’s growth model towards domestic consumption and upgraded industries to avoid the “middle income trap” plaguing developing economies:
Only 25% of middle income countries successfully transitioned to high income status over past 50 years (World Bank)
But these aims increasingly clashed with Xi’s overriding focus on stability, Party control and national renewal rather than pure GDP targets. Xi marginalized reform-minded allies of Li within the Politburo and passed wide-ranging security laws constraining civil society. On economic policy, Xi’s actions represented a “profound and deeply worrying backwards step”, according to University of Oxford China expert Rana Mitter.
With Li and his cohort unable to press their reform agenda, an atmosphere of strain permeated the leadership. Premier Li was conspicuously absent from several high-profile events, fueling speculation of efforts to sideline him.
Long stretches would pass with no public appearances together with Xi. Li‘s last public event was a January 9th Central Economic Work Conference, after which he mysteriously dropped out of scheduled Winter Davos activities.
Still, Li persisted in small ways where he could, such as condemning ineffective stimulus policies from lower governments. He gave frank assessments warning about downward pressures on the economy. Prominent state media platforms carried columns praising Li’s crisis management skills and economic acumen throughout.
By outward appearances, Li seemed secure in his position as Premier for the full 10-year term until 2023. But his sudden, shocking death prompted immediate questions about what was happening beneath the surface.
Mystery Heart Attack Raises Doubts
Details remain uncertain regarding the chain of events leading to Li Keqiang‘s death. According to the sparse official statement, Li died after emergency resuscitation efforts failed to revive him following a heart attack that struck while swimming alone.
The fact the sitting Premier could suddenly perish from a reported pre-existing condition with no prior warning or report of receiving care is highly unusual.
It fueled skepticism that political factors may lurk behind the fatal medical episode, reminiscent of previous questionable deaths like Lin Biao before him.
Notably, the ambiguous statement on the cause of death came solely from state television, while more authoritative confirmation from the party leadership or central government failed to materialize – breaking standard protocol.
Such an inconsistent, ambiguous message reinforced suspicions of political tension or infighting left unresolved after the 20th Party Congress.
It came amid rumors that Li would retire early rather than serving out his term until this Fall. This followed speculation that Li was set to leave the number two spot on the Politburo Standing Committee to make way for a younger rising star more aligned with Xi.
Recent purges of figures like former security czar Zhou Yongkang shortly before their expected retirement demonstrates the disposability of elite power players who overstay their welcome.
The scenario of Li succumbing alone while swimming also struck many as improbable, further sowing doubts.
Other proposed explanations ranged from assassination, poisoning or even suicide given the pressure from feeling politically marginalized under Xi’s dominant reign.
At minimum, the failure to rescue such a high official raised serious problems about privileged access to quality healthcare despite party propaganda claiming world-class hospitals.
It also renewed criticism of systemic issues like unchecked smoking and binge corporate drinking habits ingrained in the political culture:
“Officials smoke like chimneys and drink like fishes while mocking the general public for indulging in superstitious medical therapies,” noted one anonymous insider commentary.
Public confidence in the healthcare system’s ability to handle complex conditions has drastically declined over Premier Li’s tenure:
| Year | Confidence Healthcare System Can Handle Major Illness |
|---|---|
| 2012 | 64% |
| 2022 | 36% |
Most analysts concurred that without concrete evidence, the true circumstances may never be known in the Party’s closely guarded inner sanctum. But the abrupt end to Li’s career signified tectonic shifts for elite politics.
Implications for Leadership Transition Mechanisms
Perhaps the most significant outcome is Li’s downfall as the last Youth League disciple solidifies the sidelining of former President Hu’s Communist Youth League faction as a force for leadership promotion.
Breaking the established trajectory of being groomed to one day possibly succeed Xi Jinping himself, Li’s elimination completed the turnover from previous competing patronage networks to only Xi loyalists at top ranks.
Gone are the days where dynamic rising officials in their 50s like Li could hopscotch seniority ladders straight into the Politburo Standing Committee and be inducted as Premier within a decade.
Without a fast-tracked channel to cultivate next-generation talent, future power transitions grow more uncertain and unstable when Xi himself reaches term limits in 2027 as enshrined by the CCP Constitution.
The shortage of options leaves an unfavorable scenario looming where elderly conservative figures retain influence past their effectiveness. Alternatively, compromising party retirement norms to allow lifelong tenures risks fueling dangerous power grabs that destabilize the entire system – reminiscent of the vicious infighting following Mao’s death in 1976.
Infographic on CCP Constitution leadership age limits over time by @dtbyler
It remains to be seen whether checks and balances on power consolidation can be restored in time to produce a more orderly transition mechanism after Xi.
For now, the sudden expiration of Li’s once-bright career illuminates just how conclusively Xi has triumphed over past competing factions and centralized control firmly in his vision.
All eyes turn towards the next National Congress this October when Xi’s chosen line of succession will emerge into clearer view without the lingering shadow of Li Keqiang.