As an enthusiastic follower of armor technology and capabilities – particularly relating to China‘s rapid modernization initiatives – I‘ve extensively analyzed the details and implications of persistent weaknesses in America‘s rival superpower when it comes to ground warfare tools. Despite the PLA fielding over 7000 tanks and adding new upgraded variants annually, glaring vulnerabilities in baseline armor protection remain along with extremely high costs to comprehensively address these deficiencies across their enormous armor fleet.
Assessing China‘s Main Battle Tank Models & Capabilities
China deploys 4 main classes of indigenously produced tanks which form the core of their armor capabilities:
Type 59: Based on Soviet era T-54/55 design from the 1950s. Over 5000 in service providing bulk of PLA armored formations today. Several upgraded variants exist but largely obsolete.
Type 96: First Chinese designed MBT from the 1990s, developed upgrades to Type 59. Around 1000 produced with variants featuring 125mm guns, newer engines + improved protection.
Type 99: Latest generation Chinese MBT introduced in 1999. Possesses advanced armor (both composite + ERA), stabilized 125mm gun with autoloader, sights on par with Russian T-90S tanks. Over 500 now in PLA service.
Type 15: A lightweight tank specially designed for mountain and high-altitude areas like Tibet. Weighs around 35 tons with a 105mm gun. 100 produced so far.
In addition to these homegrown models, China has also purchased Russian main battle tanks like the T-72 in relatively small numbers.
Overall we see a mix of legacy Cold War era designs like the ubiquitous Type 59 which equip the majority of armor crews and an expanding fleet of new gen tanks like Type 96, 99 and 15 – bringing the total to over 7000 frontline armored fighting vehicles.
Glaring Gaps In Baseline Passive Armor Protection
Now while there have been notable capability upgrades in Chinese tank firepower, mobility and sensors – especially on latest models like the Type 99A – very serious deficiencies remain when it comes to baseline armor protection on these AFVs across the board.
And having to upgrade armor across over 7000 tanks to rectify these issues poses a more expensive challenge than their Aerospace equivalents.
To understand why armor remains a persistent weakness, we have to get into some technical armor details across the most widely fielded Chinese Tank models:
Type 96
The Type 96 uses both spaced steel armor with an external Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) package offering improved protection against anti-tank rounds and missiles relative to the Type 59 before it.
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But the quality and thickness of the basic steel armor itself is rated to only withstand 20-30mm cannon shells and medium caliber APDS tank ammunition. Modern APFSDS sabots with dense tungsten penetrators can slice through much thicker homogeneous steel plates.
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The ERA appears to cover the front turret and a portion of the front hull. But the relatively flat side turret and hull sections seem to only use basic steel plates barely managing 300-400mm RHA equivalence. Even old RPG-7 rockets can penetrate this scale of armor.
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There is no evidence of heavy composite armor usage combining ceramic and metal layers which enable defeating modern tank guns and missiles – as seen on leading Russian and Western tanks.
Type 99/99A
The newer Type 99 introduced limited usage of non-explosive composite armor arrays on the front hull+turret along with modular add-on ERA – providing protection from tank gun rounds exceeding 500mm RHA.
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However the basic side armor is still simple steel barely rated against 20-30mm auto cannon shells – no composites or ERA for all round protection.
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Rear/top armor also focus on bare steel plates – weak against plunging / top attack missiles. Even the newest A variants don‘t address such deficiencies making them vulnerable to ambushes
Type 15 Light Tank
As a light tank trading protection for mobility, the side, rear and top armor use the thinnest steel possible.
- Perhaps 20-25mm plate at most – even medium machine guns can penetrate. Designed to take on older tanks via frontal engagements.
So when looking at protection the majority of China‘s tank inventory has major shortcomings due to inadequate passive systems. Upgrading over 7000 tanks is also a complex endeavor.
Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) Gaps
Besides issues with base armor, China‘s usage of modular explosive reactive armor (ERA) system also has inherent limitations on the protection it can provide – especially against modern weapon systems.
The ERA used on Chinese tanks like the Type 96 and 99 focuses on defeating incoming shaped charge ammunition like RPGs or missiles. This is done by using an external layer of explosive pads or bricks on top of the base armor.
When an incoming shaped charge jet hits the ERA brick, it creates a counter explosive reaction disrupting, blocking or prematurely detonating the penetrating jet by interfering with its structure.
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But ERA arrays can still be defeated through tandem warheads using a smaller initial precursor charge to take out ERA bricks followed by the main projectile.
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Or using dense long rod Kinetic Energy penetrators with very high velocities that aren‘t as reliant on shaped charge effects are also able to penetrate reactive armor from high velocities.
So while the ERA on upgraded Chinese tanks is a good first step, it still leaves vulnerabilities against sophisticated modern anti-armor munitions designed to defeat such reactive systems and hit the weaker base armor underneath.
And all round ERA coverage rather than partial add-on modules is very rare even on the most advanced tanks due to maintenance, cost and ammunition storage concerns on the tightly packed vehicle.
Operational & Tactical Weaknesses
Setting aside technical factors, there are also underlying weaknesses in China‘s likely employment of their tanks and armor combined with vulnerabilities that opponents can exploit rather easily in tactical environments:
Urban Warfare Vulnerabilities
China‘s doctrine has focused modernization of armored vehicles for high intensity conflict – rapid maneuver warfare on open terrain, likely around disputed peripheral regions in Asia as opposed to America‘s counter insurgency focus.
But even with upgrades, engaging these tanks in dense urban terrain is very different – exposing vulnerabilities that even militants equipped with simpler anti-tank systems can exploit due to terrain constraints.
Iraqi Type 69 tanks were decimated in cities by hitting thin top+side armor just using RPGs from angles tanks couldn‘t easily retaliate against, or portable wire guided missiles crushing from above high rise buildings. As Grozny exposed, even technologically outdated insurgents armed with a few anti-tank systems could destroy dozens of advanced Russian tanks fighting in cities.
So in an island landing war around Taiwan for example, PLA tanks could withstand coastal defenses but face ambushes during the urban push to Taipei – their intended blitzkrieg grinding down into a costly slog exposing material and doctrinal disadvantages.
Reliance On Outdated Technology
Over half of China‘s 7000+ tank fleet uses outdated variants modernized only in a limited fashion like the Type 59 or Type 79 – retaining baseline design drawbacks. So defeating the majority doesn‘t even need modern munitions, 1980s era anti-tank missiles or recoilless rifles are still potent options.
Restoring and comprehensively upgrading such deathtraps against insurgents let alone modern armor requires exhaustive funds – meanwhile new light tanks like the Type 15 also lag behind contemporaries in protection.
So in protracted warfare, China‘s numerical advantage dissipates as losses accumulate while the technology gap means replacements stay reliant on dated armor technologies giving the enemy an enduring edge in tank technology. Turnover helps Western/Russian rivals more than the Chinese here.
No Focus On Counterinsurgency Doctrine
Unlike NATO tank doctrine evolving to counter IEDs, ambiguous threats via better sensors and non kinetic warfare, China‘s armor approach stays focused on traditional nation state conflict. So when faced with situations that stress flexibility like the 2008 Mumbai attacks or current Ukraine conflict, PLA forces fare much more poorly.
RPG totting militants would face little difficulty in ambushing a Chinese tank column on route to reinforce a platoon ambushed in a mountain pass for example. Bloated, insensate formations bred on a diet of conventional maneuver doctrine have severe disadvantages even against lesser trained insurgents exploiting basic vulnerabilities.
The Astronomical Price Of Comprehensive Upgrades
The sheer scale of upgrading over 7000 armored vehicles combined with the complexity of installing advanced armor technologies makes it exorbitantly expensive for even China‘s rising defense budgets. Some considerations regarding the costs:
Armor Modules & Packages
To comprehensively address survivability weaknesses, modular bolt-on armor packages that adapt to varying threats are necessary – like takes used on modern Russian T-90 or T-14 tanks. But equipping over 7000 AFVs with customized modular upgrades poses scale and design barriers:
Adapting modular heavy armor packages across non standardized older vehicles is complex – unlike new production tanks with standardized points to bolt on upgraded armor suites. Retrofit challenges push costs and time higher.
The man hours and specialized facilities needed would be unprecedented – with Bottlenecks in finding skilled engineers and armor production capabilities limiting any crash upgrades. Overall, upgrading 2000-3000 tanks alone could cost anywhere from $3-6 Billion factoring program management costs.
Active Protection Systems
Installing Active Protection like Russian Afganit that destroys incoming missiles before impact could help offset baseline armor disadvantages. But again scale costs are astronomical:
APS suites cost $600,000+ apiece factoring R&D costs, specialized sensors/radars, computing, intercept charges and the expertise to integrate properly into older analog tanks.
So outfitting most frontline 7000 Chinese tanks could cost a staggering $4+ Billion just on APS systems alone! And likely over $500 Million annually for maintenance and replenishing interceptor charges.
The expenses involved likely restrict such upgrades to a few elite Chinese tank battalions for now, while most rely on amended older generation ERA for protection. The weak armor issue seems unlikely to disappear anytime soon.
Advanced Composite Armor
Even installing modular non explosive reactive composite armor arrays combining ceramic, metal and heat treated layers on structural weakpoints faces difficulties.
Producing composites light and resilient enough for retrofits requires intensive quality control and manufacturing expertise China still lags behind Russia/France/Germany in. The costs are also nontrivial with advanced 3rd generation Dorchester arrays on British tanks running around $500,000+ apiece given exotic material and processing requirements.
Similar solutions for Chinese tanks would cost tens of billions over the entire fleet and fundamentally alter the terrain mobility versus protection trade off balance as vehicles get heavier. So near term reliance stays on simpler steel + ERA mixes unable to meet modern anti armor threats.
Perspectives on Chinese Tank Advantages
There are some factors and perspectives though that point to advantages in the Chinese tank ecosystem and armor protected warfare capability:
Type 96 Autoloader System
The autoloader mechanism on the Type 96 providing automated ammunition feeds to its 125mm main gun is regarded as faster and more reliable than contemporary Russian equivalents – enabling a higher rate of accurate sustain fire critical for winning armored engagements that erupt in close violent melees.
This advantage in intense firefights can help offset any deficiency in armor somewhat. Tank battles are ultimately about who lands the first penetrative hit.
Type 15 Light Tank Mobility
The Type 15‘s small tonnage compared to heavier tanks enhances strategic mobility since it can be more flexibly deployed over China‘s vast mountainous terrains and even via large transport aircraft in contested zones like Taiwan. Lightly armored tanks have proven survivable against peer threats when combined with superior sensors, networking and pre-emptive tactics.
Asymmetric Warfare Offset – Theater Ballistic/Cruise Missiles
Facing difficulties in massively upgrading armor protection across huge fleets, China seems positioned to rely more heavily on standoff precision weapons flow cruise, hypersonic and advanced ballistic missiles instead of risky close armor maneuvers.
Using long range rockets and dense surveillance grids, Chinese forces could destroy enemy armored spearheads via pinpoint missile strikes rather than risky tank on tank duels losing advantages of initiative and standoff range.
Cheaper Replacements from Mass Production
Unlike America‘s sophisticated but limited production Abrams tanks costing $10 Million apiece, China‘s simpler designs enable mass producing hundreds of basic MBTs annually at lower price points even with remedial upgrades.
So trading 2 obsolete Chinese tanks to destroy one advanced Western vehicle can still yield battlefield gains long term relying on the attrition and numbers game. Quantity has a quality all of its own. And even basic RPG armed insurgents struggle to comprehensively stop armored assaults despite losses inflicted.
So in essence, rational Chinese Generals seem focused on asymmetric missiles, airpower and naval growth rather than very expensive comprehensive armor upgrades right now. Protecting tanks lies more in camouflage, deception and initiative than thickness of armor steel as peers like Russia have also realized in places like Ukraine.
The number of missiles held will decide armored war outcomes above number of tanks held.
Final Verdict
Analyzing China‘s main battle tanks using an enthusiast lens reveals that while recent upgrades have enhanced aspects of firepower and mobility – vulnerabilities still remain in baseline armor protection technologies including inferior steel quality, inadequate ERA coverage and limited composite usage that leaves large weak surface areas even in latest gen models.
Addressing these deficiencies is also monumentally expensive due to the technical complexity and program management costs of refitting over 7000 armored vehicles – ranging from modular armor packages, APS systems to advanced composite arrays.
The astronomical price tags likely restrict comprehensive upgrades to only a fraction of China‘s tank fleet for now. So while technology progresses, material gaps seem set to give countries like the US, Britain and even India continuing edge in Armored warfare – especially in flexible contexts like counterinsurgency or high intensity urban combat where weaknesses get exposed despite ERA upgrades.
Bulk of equipment and doctrine improvements suggest China‘s land warfare approach will likely emphasize long range precision strikes, deception and aerial/naval dominance more than direct costly armor thrusts – so while workhorse vehicles like the Type 96 and 99 can threaten neighbors and seize territory in short sharp campaigns, they remain highly vulnerable in protracted wars of attrition.